By Mathias Bule

An old monkey dies attempting a jump it once made with ease, goes the old saying. Its memory insists that the leap is familiar, but memory cannot restore the strength that time has taken away.

The image offers a stark way to understand Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki’s apparent effort to project influence inside Ethiopia: a regime may remember when it could shape events beyond its borders, yet fail to recognize that its capacity—and the political landscape around it—has changed.

The war to separate Eritrea from Ethiopia was backed by numerous foreign powers. Egypt was at the forefront of the process to create a weakened, landlocked Ethiopia. The armed group led by Isaias received massive support in terms of weaponry, training, and financing. Added to this, the weak leadership of the Derg regime provided the opportunity that led to Eritrea's secession. Shabia's position at that time was merely a product of circumstance, not a sustainable strength built on its own merit. Believing it defeated the Derg solely through its own efficiency and struggle is an illusory truth.

Now even the Eritrean situation is deteriorating. Decades of indefinite national service have driven many young Eritreans to flee, depriving the country of workers, professionals, and future leaders. Economic stagnation and isolation have narrowed the government’s options. Meanwhile, the command structure has aged, and its habits remain rooted in the methods of a previous era. In a region increasingly shaped by drones, digital intelligence, and complex economic relationships, a strategy built on coercion and clandestine maneuvering may be less effective—and more dangerous—than the regime assumes. And this time around, the Eritreans are up against a meteorically changed Ethiopia.

The most consequential leap would be an attempt to act as Egypt’s proxy in destabilizing Ethiopia. Egypt has a clear strategic interest in the Nile, which it had pursued in a stale sense of entitlement and hydro hegemony. Eritrea, sharing a border with Ethiopia and governed by a highly centralized regime, might appear to offer a useful foothold for pressure. But serving another country’s strategic goals is not the same as possessing the strength to carry them out. A proxy can become an instrument of someone else’s policy while bearing the greatest risks itself.

Ethiopia’s internal vulnerabilities should not be mistaken for an absence of state capacity. With a population exceeding 135 million, a substantial economy, and a deeply rooted political and administrative system, Ethiopia has far greater resources than Eritrea.

The imbalance matters because destabilization is rarely a controlled instrument. Once armed groups, political grievances, and cross-border tensions are encouraged, they can produce consequences that exceed the sponsor’s intentions. A government may hope to create pressure on a rival while keeping the conflict limited. Yet the rival can respond, the local actors can pursue their own agendas, and the sponsor can find itself drawn into a confrontation it lacks the resources to manage. The more brittle the sponsor’s own state, the greater the danger that the effort will rebound.

For Eritrea, the costs would be especially severe. A policy of perpetual regional interference would consume scarce resources and deepen the country’s isolation. It could intensify the government’s dependence on external backers. That dependence may appear useful in the short term, but it can compromise the regime’s freedom of action. A state that relies on another power to pursue its ambitions may eventually discover that its own priorities come second, it at all the Eritrean regime has them at all, rather than trying and prolong its rule through the brewing of turmoil.

The domestic consequences should not be overlooked. Eritrea’s population has endured years of restricted freedoms, compulsory service, and limited economic opportunity. Further regional adventurism would ask an exhausted society to bear new costs for goals that may bring it little benefit. The young people whose labor and loyalty the government needs are precisely those who have been leaving in large numbers. A regime that treats its citizens as an endless reserve of soldiers and sacrifice risks weakening the very foundations on which its power depends. Note that more than 700,000 Eritreans made exodus to Ethiopia where they have found safe haven.

The old monkey’s mistake is not merely that it jumps. It is that it trusts an old measure of distance and an old understanding of its own strength. Isaias Afwerki’s government may still possess formidable tools of control at home, but domestic repression should not be confused with regional capacity. The ability to silence dissent does not automatically translate into the ability to shape a larger neighbor’s politics, or manage a widening conflict.

Eritrea’s leaders may believe that destabilizing Ethiopia would restore their regional relevance or advance a partner’s interests. Yet the likely outcome is deeper economic strain, and a population pushed further toward despair and departure in Eritrea. The leap meant to demonstrate that the regime remains powerful could instead reveal how much its strength has eroded.

If Asmara acts on the assumption that the methods of an earlier era still guarantee success, it may discover too late that political memory is not military capacity—and that an overreach designed to weaken Ethiopia could automatically result in the total collapse of the regime in Eritrea.